Motor Intentions and Non-Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debatepeer-review

Standard

Motor Intentions and Non-Observational Knowledge of Action : A Standard Story. / Blomberg, Olle; Brozzo, Chiara.

In: Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 3, 09.2017, p. 137-146.

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/debatepeer-review

Harvard

Blomberg, O & Brozzo, C 2017, 'Motor Intentions and Non-Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story', Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 137-146. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.249

APA

Blomberg, O., & Brozzo, C. (2017). Motor Intentions and Non-Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 6(3), 137-146. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.249

Vancouver

Blomberg O, Brozzo C. Motor Intentions and Non-Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2017 Sep;6(3):137-146. https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.249

Author

Blomberg, Olle ; Brozzo, Chiara. / Motor Intentions and Non-Observational Knowledge of Action : A Standard Story. In: Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 2017 ; Vol. 6, No. 3. pp. 137-146.

Bibtex

@article{181e149b330340fc9d92596c0979a752,
title = "Motor Intentions and Non-Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story",
abstract = "According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent{\textquoteright}s habits and skills. Markos Valaris (2015) argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge of action. He concludes that we therefore have to jettison its conception of actions as mindless bodily movements animated from the outside by intentions. Here we defend the standard story. We can make sense of the reach of non-observational knowledge of action once we reject the following two assumptions: (i) that an intended habitual or skilled action is a so-called basic action—that is, an action that doesn{\textquoteright}t involve any finer-grained intentions—and (ii) that an agent, in acting, is merely executing one intention rather than a whole hierarchy of more or less fine-grained intentions. We argue that (i) and (ii) are false. ",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, non-observational knowledge of action, Causal Theory of Action, intentions, motor representations, Markos Valaris, basic actions, habit, skill, reductionism",
author = "Olle Blomberg and Chiara Brozzo",
year = "2017",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1002/tht3.249",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = "137--146",
journal = "Thought",
issn = "2161-2234",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Motor Intentions and Non-Observational Knowledge of Action

T2 - A Standard Story

AU - Blomberg, Olle

AU - Brozzo, Chiara

PY - 2017/9

Y1 - 2017/9

N2 - According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent’s habits and skills. Markos Valaris (2015) argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge of action. He concludes that we therefore have to jettison its conception of actions as mindless bodily movements animated from the outside by intentions. Here we defend the standard story. We can make sense of the reach of non-observational knowledge of action once we reject the following two assumptions: (i) that an intended habitual or skilled action is a so-called basic action—that is, an action that doesn’t involve any finer-grained intentions—and (ii) that an agent, in acting, is merely executing one intention rather than a whole hierarchy of more or less fine-grained intentions. We argue that (i) and (ii) are false.

AB - According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent’s habits and skills. Markos Valaris (2015) argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge of action. He concludes that we therefore have to jettison its conception of actions as mindless bodily movements animated from the outside by intentions. Here we defend the standard story. We can make sense of the reach of non-observational knowledge of action once we reject the following two assumptions: (i) that an intended habitual or skilled action is a so-called basic action—that is, an action that doesn’t involve any finer-grained intentions—and (ii) that an agent, in acting, is merely executing one intention rather than a whole hierarchy of more or less fine-grained intentions. We argue that (i) and (ii) are false.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - non-observational knowledge of action

KW - Causal Theory of Action

KW - intentions

KW - motor representations

KW - Markos Valaris

KW - basic actions

KW - habit

KW - skill

KW - reductionism

U2 - 10.1002/tht3.249

DO - 10.1002/tht3.249

M3 - Comment/debate

VL - 6

SP - 137

EP - 146

JO - Thought

JF - Thought

SN - 2161-2234

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 180397492