The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms

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Milner and Goodale’s Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH) is regarded as common ground in recent discussions of visual consciousness. A central part of TVSH is a functional model of vision and action (a functional perception-action model, PAM for short). In this paper, I provide a brief overview of these current discussions and argue that PAM is ambiguous between a strong and a weak version. I argue that, given a standard way of individuating computational mechanisms, the available evidence cannot be used to distinguish between these versions. This not only has consequences for philosophical theories of the role of visual consciousness but also has implications for the role of experimental evidence in model testing in cognitive neuroscience.
Original languageEnglish
JournalMind & Language
Issue number4
Pages (from-to)416-445
Number of pages30
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2017

    Research areas

  • Faculty of Humanities - Two-Visual-Stream Hypothesis, computational mechanisms, representational formats, philosophy of science, model testing in cognitive neuroscience

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