Shifting Chinese leaders and leaderships have seen vested interests as a disruptive driver of political dynamics in China ever since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. Obviously, the nature and dynamics of vested interests are in the eyes of the beholder. But given the fact that China’s leaders time and again focus on the negative influence of vested interests, to the extent that Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping have stated that the one-party system may collapse if vested interested are not tackled resolutely by their roots, it is pertinent to ask what is the nature of vested interests in the perception of recent Chinese leaderships and what is the basis for assuming that such interests are detrimental to the maintenance of contemporary Communist Party rule? In a wider perspective, I am interested to examine how vested interests form ad why, how they exert their influence, how they play into elite politics and the dynamics of policy making in China, and how they can be explained theoretically. The paper will examine two sets of cases relating to the energy sector, viz. the long-standing opposition to integration of wind into the grid corruption networks within the energy sector. The energy sector has been chosen since it is traditionally associated with strong political and factional interests in China.