Organizing cyber capability across military and intelligence entities: collaboration, separation, or centralization
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Organizing cyber capability across military and intelligence entities : collaboration, separation, or centralization. / Liebetrau, Tobias.
In: Policy Design and Practice, Vol. 6, No. 2, 09.2023, p. 131-145.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Organizing cyber capability across military and intelligence entities
T2 - collaboration, separation, or centralization
AU - Liebetrau, Tobias
N1 - Special Issue on Governing Cyber Crises: Policy Lessons from a Comparative Analysis; Guest Editors: François Delerue and Monica Kaminska
PY - 2023/9
Y1 - 2023/9
N2 - This paper explores how the Netherlands, France, and Norway organize their cyber capabilities at the intersection of intelligence services and military entities and provides recommendations for policy and research development in the field. Drawing out key organizational differences and ambiguities, the analysis identifies three models of organizing military and intelligence relations: A Dutch collaboration model, a French separation model, and a Norwegian centralization model. Despite their divergence in organizing cyber capabilities, the three countries converge on the assumption that both responding to cyber conflict short of war and developing military cyber power are dependent on the skills, information, and infrastructure of intelligence services. This calls for cooperation and coordination across military and intelligence entities. However, it remains unclear whether decision makers have systematically assessed the implications of the organizational structure for the ways in which the two dimensions relate to and shape one another at strategic, tactical, and operational levels. The paper concludes that there is a need for increased political attention and a deliberate approach to how the organizational model allows for the operational cyber capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which political implications at both national and international levels.
AB - This paper explores how the Netherlands, France, and Norway organize their cyber capabilities at the intersection of intelligence services and military entities and provides recommendations for policy and research development in the field. Drawing out key organizational differences and ambiguities, the analysis identifies three models of organizing military and intelligence relations: A Dutch collaboration model, a French separation model, and a Norwegian centralization model. Despite their divergence in organizing cyber capabilities, the three countries converge on the assumption that both responding to cyber conflict short of war and developing military cyber power are dependent on the skills, information, and infrastructure of intelligence services. This calls for cooperation and coordination across military and intelligence entities. However, it remains unclear whether decision makers have systematically assessed the implications of the organizational structure for the ways in which the two dimensions relate to and shape one another at strategic, tactical, and operational levels. The paper concludes that there is a need for increased political attention and a deliberate approach to how the organizational model allows for the operational cyber capacity to travel from, translate into, and shape intelligence and military entities and to which political implications at both national and international levels.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Cybersecurity
KW - cybersecurity governance
KW - European security
KW - cyber capability
U2 - 10.1080/25741292.2022.2127551
DO - 10.1080/25741292.2022.2127551
M3 - Journal article
VL - 6
SP - 131
EP - 145
JO - Policy Design and Practice
JF - Policy Design and Practice
SN - 2574-1292
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 321488054